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This research aims to examine the implications of excess cash holdings on firm value based on 
agency theory. Data were obtained from a total sample of 1828 non-financial public companies in 
Indonesia, with 672 exceeding normal cash holdings using the panel regression techniques. The 
result showed that excess cash holdings have a negative effect on the firm value which is stronger 
for more concentrated ownership, for more dispersed ownership and for more financially difficult 
firms. Overall the empirical finding showed that excess cash holdings acts as a significant indicator 
of agency problems. 












Theoretically, company managers need to 
properly allocate cash holdings to maximize the 
wealth of its shareholders by balancing the costs 
and marginal benefits using the right allocation 
strategy (Opler et al., 1999). However, the 
problem associated with the use of this 
technique is determining the cash holding 
excessiveness. This research, therefore, focuses 
on the real difference of the cash holding, with a 
strategic benefit for company values as opposed 
to the old viewpoint, which is only considered as 
part of the working capital. According to Powell 
and Baker (2010), a company's decision on the 
amount of money to be held can affect its value. 
Companies tend to allow flexibility to avoid 
poor investment and financial difficulties. Cash 
holdings are accumulated to anticipate future 
investment opportunity with higher values 
(Mikkelson & Partch (2003), Simutin (2012), 
and Faulkender & Wang (2006)) According to 
Livdan et al. (2009), the effects of financial 
constraints on risk, showed that excess cash 
holdings contain information used to reduce 
financial constraints. Therefore, investors 
respond more positively. Conversley, Fresard, 
and Salva (2010) stated that excess cash holdings 
are monies that are not tied to operation and 
investment but inefficiently squandered and 
misused. Excess cash holdings are company 
resources that are not aligned with the interests 
of its shareholders (Jensen (1986); & Stulz 
(1990)). This argument is in line with Simutin's 
(2010) and Khieu & Phyles (2012) opinion, 
which stated that the agency problem tends to 
exist due to excess cash holdings. 
Lower values are obtained with the 
exploitation of a company’s resources by 
managerial shareholders. The lower value is in 
line with the research conducted by Faulkender 
and Wang (2006), Lee and Powell (2011), Chen, 
et al. (2012), which stated that the marginal 
value of cash holdings decreases following the 
increase in the company’s income. According to 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), a unit of 
currency significantly contributes to the return of 
less money, when the company's shareholders 
invest in unprofitable projects. A decrease in 
market value shows a problem in the agency, 
with a possibility that the controlling 
shareholders (insiders) are exploiting its 
company resources.  
This research aims to determine the 
implications of excess cash holdings to the value 
of a company using the agency theory 
empirically. It also defines the moderating 
variable of concentrated and dispersed 
ownership to strengthen the negative values of 
the company. Earlier methodologies were based 
on Fama and French (1998). However, this 
research applied the modern specification model 
based on the creation of value by Ramezani et 
al. (2002) and Bacidore et al. (1997). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
agency theory arises due to the presence of 
information asymmetry and conflict of interests. 
Excess cash holdings are the backup money 
allocated to a company for its daily operation 
(Attig et al. 2011). It is also defined as the most 
favored and cheapest kind of liquid asset 
converted into another asset. A company needs 
to allocate cash holdings at a reasonable price, to 
avoid paying off excesses to shareholders. 
According to Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), the marginal cash value of nonfinancial 
companies in the United States from 1971-2001 
decreased with an increase in cash holdings. 
Similarly, in 2012, Chen et al. researched 8016 
companies in the United States and found that 
the addition of cash to an already abundant 
amount led to agency problems. Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2004) stated that the presence of 
agency problems was due to the misuse of funds 
by the managers, thereby leaving debtors to 
enjoy the profit from the company liquidation. 
The description led to the following hypothesis:  
H1: excess cash holdings negatively affect the 
 Value of a company. 
 
 This study emphasizes the availability 
of empirical evidence in dealing with the 
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problems associated due to excess cash holdings. 
According to the entrenchment theory, agency 
conflict type 2 has a higher chance of occurring 
in companies with a significant number of 
influential shareholders. These categories of 
people are capable of using their rights to re-
distribute wealth among themselves. According 
to previous research, reduction in company 
performance tends to occur due to the high 
distribution of shares among insiders (Mitton, 
(2002), Lemons & Lins (2003), Suranta & 
Midiastuty (2003), and Gunarsih (2003)). 
 Companies in many countries, 
including Indonesia, consist of a concentrated 
ownership structure with inner shareholders in 
dominant positions capable of controlling 
managers (La Porta et al., 1999). The 
shareholders can expropriate minority 
shareholders and creditors (Shleifer & Vishny 
(1986), Stulz (1988), and Burkart et al. (1997)). 
According to Faisal (2013), the concentration 
level of insiders following empirical testing is 
above 70%. Therefore, the second hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H2: the negative effects of excess cash holdings 
on the value of the company are stronger 
when the ownership is concentrated. 
 
 Conflicts in agencies tend to arise from 
the separation of ownership and control, which 
occurs in companies with smaller investors 
(Jensen & Meckling (1976), and Morck et al. 
(1988)). According to a research conducted by 
Jani et al. (2004) using ownership of shares less 
than 30%, shareholders have low or none 
incentives to supervise management due to the 
expensive rate of the monitoring fee. Also, when 
the performance of a company increases, the 
benefits are reaped by all investors. 
 However, the lack of managerial 
supervision by shareholders leads to personal 
incentives by using company funds to carry out 
luxurious personal activities. Jensen (1986) 
stated that managers might accumulate cash 
holdings for their benefits, which tend to reduce 
the risk of companies from going extinct. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: the negative effects of excess cash holdings 
toward the value of the company are strong-
er when the ownership is widely dispersed. 
  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed 
an agency conflict between shareholders and 
debtors. According to their research, some 
shareholders need excess cash holdings to be 
invested in high-return programs, which are 
risky. However, the shareholders believe that 
when a company has serious financial 
difficulties, the benefits associated with excess 
cash holding are allocated to the debt holders. A 
company’s value tends to raise with benefit to 
the cash holdings of the shareholders and vice 
versa (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004). The 
proposed hypothesis is as follows:  
H4: the negative effects of excess cash holdings 
toward the value of the company are strong-
er when it faces financial difficulties. 
 
 The following is a framework of conceptual 
research: 
 









Methods To Estimate Normal Cash Holdings 
Excess cash holdings are determined by 
the residual value of estimated cash holdings. 
This research, therefore, uses three approaches 
with a data panel structure to estimate the value 
of cash holdings. 
 
a. Static panel data regressive model. The mod-
el implicitly estimates the value of the cash hold-
ings of the static models, with the assumption 
that there is no need to adjust the new cash hold-
ings target. The model is as follows: 
 
                 ∑        
 
          
     (1) 
 
b. Dynamic panel data regression model. This 
model admits that there is an adjustment process 
to standard cash holdings, thereby leading to a 
lag.  
The autoregressive dynamic regressive statistic 
model is as follows: 
                                  
∑       
 
              (2) 
 
c. The regressive model with the method esti-
mated GLS through the procedure iterative 
Cochrane Orcutt. Autocorrelation is showed by 
the interdependency of disruption from one re-
gressive model following the AR (1) structure. 
The model is an estimator GLS method with the 
regressive statistic model of EGLS as follows: 
 
                ∑       
 




              =  
CASH HOLDINGSt– ρCASHHOLDINGSt-1 
  ̅   = Xi,t– ρXi,t-1 
 ̅t = ut– ρut-1 
 
Symbol αi and αt are firm-specific effects and 
period-effects. X is a vector containing independ-
ent variables, known as an investment oppor-
tunity (GROWTH), company size  
(SIZE_RIIL), financial difficulties (DISTRESS), 
cash flow volatility  (RV) or (VCF), cash 
flow(CFLOW), investment (CAPEX), converti-
bility (CONVERT), leverage (LEV), dividend 
(DDIV_DPS), cash conversion cycle (CCC), 
debt maturity (MATURITY), assets tangibility 
(TANGIBLE). The cash holdings estimators are 
selected based on the criteria of the BLUE re-
gression model and the goodness of fit, which 
are the values of Adjusted R2, and SSR (Sum 
squared Residual). The higher the value of Ad-
justed R2, and less the SSR, the better the model.
 According to those criteria, the excess 
cash holdings are calculated based on two of the 
best specification as follows: 















Methods To Test Research Hypothesis 
The research sample is selected from com-
panies with positive excess cash holdings and 
complete data, which are determined by the val-
ue of residual estimation from the chosen specifi-
cation model. A total number of 672 observa-
tions were obtained from consumer discretionary 
(185), Materials (143), staples (110), and indus-
tries (104).  
 
Research Variables in terms of definition, formu-
la, and identification used to test the hypothesis 
are provided in the table below. 
The agency problem tends to exist due to excess 
cash holdings. 
 
The Research Statistics Model of this research 
is Yi,t = α0 + β1Xi,t + Ʃβ2CONTROLS it + ε i. 
Coefficient β is estimated by using the 
Moderated Regression Analysis approach, as 
seen in Table 2. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
The research hypothesis is tested using 
two models. The first calculates the value of the 
excess cash holdings using the residual value by 
estimating the static model regression. 
The second calculates it using the residual 
value of estimated model dynamic regression. 
The estimated result of each hypothesis is as 
follows: 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions to Test Research Hypothesis





Abnormal return is a proxy of the value of the firm, with 
excesses from the normal return as follows: 
                   
 i.tis  abnormal return  
R i,t is the individual return  
  (    )Expected return, using market return. Formula: 







Excess Cash Holdings is calculated from the residual value with 
a positive sign as 
follows:                                
                              
               
               






DOWN1 is dummy variable, DOWN1 set one if the most significant 
shareholders have some share 70% <share <100%, and 
DOWN1 set zero, otherwise 
Moderating 
Variables  
DOWN2 is dummy variable, DOWN2 set one if the most significant 
shareholder has share <25%, and DOWN2 set zero, otherwise. 
DISTRESS is the dummy variable, which measured by the TIER ratio. 
Formula TIER =
       
             
. Dummy variable set one if 
TIER<0, and zero otherwise 
EVA i,t Economic Value Added is a financial performance measure based 
on the shareholder's value creation. Formula: 
                        
          ⁄
 
NOPAT = Net Operating Profit After Tax 
CAPITAL = Book Value of Equity 





RISK i,t is the deviation of  asset pricing as a proxy of unsystematic risk 
normalized by asset total t  
SIZEi,t is company size 
Formula:                       
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H1 β1 negative ABNRETURN t,i = α1 + β1XCASHHHOLDINGSi,t + Ʃβ2CONTROLS it +ε 
it 
H2 β3 negative ABNRETURNt,i = α1 + β1XCASHHHOLDINGS i,t + β2DOWN1i,t + β3 
i,t * DOWN1,t +Ʃ β4CONTROLS it +ε it 
H3 β3 negative ABNRETURNt,i = α1 + β1XCASHHHOLDINGSi,t+ β2DOWN2i,t + 
β3XCASHHOLDINGSi,t * DOWN2i,,t + ƩβiCONTROLSit +ε it 
H4 β3 negative ABNRETURNt,i = α1 + β1XCASHHHOLDINGSi,t+ β2DISTRESSi,t + 
β3XCASHHOLDINGSi,t *DISTRESS,t + ƩβiCONTROLSit +εit 
 
Table 3. The Effect of Excess Cash Holding on Firm Value 
Dependent Variable: ABNRETURN           
 1 2 
  Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat   
C -0,209 -1,340   -0,441 -5,769 *** 
XCASHHOLDING -0,767 -2,730 *** -0,579 -2,588 *** 
EVA 1,744 19,533 *** 1,699 26,425 *** 
RISK 1,146 3,401 *** 0,953 4,651 *** 
SIZE -0,006 -0,710   0,015 2,372 ** 
       
Observation 672     773     
 
Table 4. The Role of Concentrated Ownership in Strengthening the Negative Effect of Excess Cash 
Holding on Value of the Firm 
Dependent Variable: ABNRETURN       
  1 2 
 Concentrated Share Ownership 
  Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat   











1   
EVA 1,706 40,285 *** 1,739 
32,5
02 *** 
RISK 1,118 3,785 *** 0,899 
5,54
6 *** 
SIZE 0,011 1,066   0,015 
2,13
9 ** 












Observation 644     734     
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Table 5. The Role of Widely Spread Ownership in Strengthening the Negative Effect of Excess Cash 
 Holding on Value of the firm 
Dependent Variable: ABNRETURN       
  1 2 
 Widely Spread Share Ownership 
  Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat   
C -0,463 -2,485 ** -0,466 -5,312 *** 
XCASHHOLDING -0,507 -3,926 *** -0,050 -0,127   
EVA 1,657 32,845 *** 1,641 44,739 *** 
RISK 1,059 3,249 *** 0,858 4,528 *** 
SIZE 0,012 0,923   0,016 2,196 ** 
DOWN2 0,032 0,673   -0,007 -0,208   
XCASHHOLDING*DOWN2 -2,537 -2,492 ** -2,385 -2,644 *** 
       
Observation 644     734     
1.  
 
Table 6. The Role of Financial Difficulties in Strengthening the Negative Effect of Excess Cash 
 Holding on Value of the firm 
Dependent Variable: ABNRETURN       
  1 2 
 Financial Difficulties 
  Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat   
C -0,326 -0,326 * -0,462 -0,462 *** 
XCASHHOLDING 0,451 0,451   -0,346 -0,346   
EVA 2,050 2,050 *** 1,504 1,504 *** 
RISK 1,256 1,256 *** 1,199 1,199 *** 
SIZE -0,001 -0,001   0,014 0,014   
DISTRESS -0,174 -0,174 ** -0,154 -0,154 *** 
XCASHHOLDING*DISTRESS -2,853 -2,853 * -4,794 -4,794 *** 
       
Observation 591     649     
2. The summary of the estimation is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Summary of Estimated Result 
Hyp Model β Direction Coeff. t-Stat   Decision 
H1 1 β1 negative  -0,767 -2,730 *** H1  
 2 β1 negative -0,579 -2,588 *** Support and robust 
H2 1 β3 negative -4,433 -4,012 *** H3 
 2 β3 negative -2,321 -1,769 * Support and robust 
               
H3 1 β3 negative -2,537 -2,492 ** H4 
 2 β3 negative -2,385 -2,644 *** Support and robust 
H4 1 β3 negative -2,853 -1,588 * H5  
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Result of The Effect Of Excess Cash Holdings 
Toward The Company Value 
Hypothesis 1 estimates that excess cash 
holdings negatively affect a company’s coefficient 
value. Therefore, hypothesis 1, which stated that 
excess cash holdings affect a company’s value 
negatively, is supported. This empirical finding 
showed that excess cash holdings are a significant 
pointer to supporting the agency hypothesis. 
Therefore, this research supports the agency cost of 
free cash flow theories of Pinkowitz & Williamson 
(2004), Faulkender & Wang (2006), Lee & Powell 
(2011), and Chen et al. (2012). 
 
The Result Of The Effect Of Concentrated  
Ownership In Moderating  The Effect Of Excess 
Cash Holdings Toward The Value Of A Company 
Hypothesis 3 estimates the effect of 
concentrated ownership in strengthening the 
negative effects of excess cash holdings toward the 
value of a company. The result shows that the 
negative effects of excess cash holdings toward the 
value of a company are stronger when the main 
shareholder is over 70%, as shown on model 2, 
with a similar significant sign of the coefficient. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is supported. The 
highly concentrated ownership affects the negative 
effects of excess cash holdings because over 70% of 
the proportion, are dominant (Jani et al. (2004), 
and Faisal (2013)). The expectations in the 
occurrence of agency problems are reflected in the 
cutting of company value by outside investors. This 
test result supports the findings of Liu (2011) and 
Attig, et al. (2011), Kusnadi (2011). 
 
Result From The Effect Of Highly Dispersed 
Ownership In Moderating The Effect Of Excess 
Cash Holdings On Firm Value 
Hypothesis 4 estimates the effect highly 
dispersed ownership strengthens the negative effects 
of excess cash holdings toward the value of a 
company. The testing result shows a negative sign 
on the coefficient of interaction, which is supported 
by the result of the second model. Therefore the 
problem of agency between shareholders and the 
supported manager is in line with the findings of 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Lee and Lee (2009), and 
Faisal (2013). Highly dispersed ownership allows 
the entrenchment of company management due to 
the free-rider problem. According to Faisal (2013), 
a company's value decreases when the 
concentration level of ownership is lower than 30% 
due to the problem associated with the free-rider. 
 
The Result Of The Effect Of Financial 
Difficulties In Moderating The Effect Of Excess 
Cash Holdings Toward The Value Of A Company 
 Financial difficulty is a problem caused by 
the inability of a company to fulfill its obligation. 
When a company faces financial difficulties, it 
means that the chosen investments are those with 
very low risk; therefore, shareholders do not have a 
choice in placing it in other projects with higher 
returns, to avoid agency conflict. The result of 
estimation and re-estimation shows that the 
coefficient interaction consists of negative signs and 
significance. Therefore hypothesis 5 is supported in 
that a company with severe financial difficulties. 
This research result is consistent with the findings 
of Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), which stated 
that cash holdings are valued less when the 
company has financial difficulties and responded 
negatively by outside investors because they prefer 




In conclusion, the findings prove that excess 
cash holdings negatively affect the value of a 
company, therefore, it is a significant clue in 
supporting the agency hypothesis. The highly 
concentrated ownership structure is supported by 
the research data, that strengthens the negative 
effects of excess cash holdings toward the 
company's value. This is consistent with the 
expropriation/entrenchment hypothesis, which 
stated that the expropriation act is more dominant 
when the company ownership is highly 
concentrated. The result is consistent with the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis, which stated 
that the act of expropriating excess cash holdings by 
management is more dominantly conducted when 
there is a free-rider problem amongst the 
shareholders due to dispersed ownership, thereby, 
leading to inadequate management supervision. 
Besides, the agency problem between the insider 
and the debt holders when the company has severe 
financial difficulties leads to low-risk investment. 
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The result elicits negative responses from outside 
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